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n the first of four lectures on Nietzsche’s philosophy, “The Will to Power 
as Art” (1936-37), Heidegger argues that the unique and important 
relationship between truth and art, which Nietzsche suggests, must be 
understood “with a view to the conquest of nihilism,”1 i.e., within the historical 
context of a radically novel interpretation of sensuous reality.  Beginning with 
the project of overturning Platonism as the active countermovement to nihilism, 
this essay interprets Heidegger’s difficult notion of the discordant relationship 
between truth (the fixation of semblance) and art (the transfiguration of 
semblance) in Nietzsche’s philosophy, emphasizing the supreme importance of 
art as life’s greatest enhancing force.  The analysis is conducted within the 
context of Nietzsche’s metaphysics as presented by Heidegger, who claims that 
as a metaphysical thinker, Nietzsche could not explain such topics as “truth,” 
“Being,” and “Becoming” in terms beyond the conceptualization of Western 
philosophy.  In spite of that, his thought intimates a movement beyond the 
constraints of the tradition within which he was entrenched.   In addition to 
providing a detailed exegesis of Heidegger’s lecture course, the problems 
associated with Heidegger’s metaphysical interpretation of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy will be discussed, problems that commentators such as Alan Schrift 
(Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation) believe stem from Heidegger’s 
stringent and restrictive methodological choices for approaching the reading of 
Nietzsche.2  
What is Nietzsche’s understanding of nihilism? What is the 
significance of waging an aesthetic war against this negative cultural force? 
Attending to such questions will clarify Nietzsche’s unique conception of art as 
                                                 
1 Martin Heidegger, “The Will to Power as Art,” in Nietzsche, trans. by D.  F.  Krell, 
[Volumes 1 & 2] (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 161.   
2 Alan Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation: Between Hermeneutics and 
Deconstruction (New York: Routledge, 1990), 14-20.  It must be noted that Shrift’s critique, in the 
tradition of Heidegger’s “critical confrontation” with Nietzsche, focuses not only on the 
problematic aspects of Heidegger’s reading,, but also elucidates the supreme strength of 
Heidegger’s interpretation.  Schrift’s brilliant and detailed critique acknowledges the debt to 
which philosophy owes Heidegger for his monumentally influential interpretation of Nietzsche.   
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a countermovement to nihilism, which finds its expression in the task of 
overturning Platonism.  Nietzsche’s determination to act against Platonism is 
presented as a “fundamental experience, that is, his growing insight into the 
basic developments of [his] history.”3 Accordingly, Nietzsche’s work to 
overturn Platonism unfolds on historical, rather than theoretical grounds.   
Nihilism, he recognizes, is the historical development in which the “highest 
values devaluate themselves.”4 The supposed guarantors of “Being” and “truth,” 
i.e., theism (faith), philosophical rationalism (reason), and science/technology 
(logical empiricism) lose legitimacy and force.  They prove inadequate to the 
task of categorically explaining the vast complexities of existence because they 
are driven by the following erroneous assumptions: (1) The belief that the 
universe in explainable in definitive terms, it has “aim” and “purpose,” and (2) 
The belief that a unified system of thought exists that explains the “true” 
nature of the universe in its totality.  All such disciplines, holding complete 
optimism in the power of truth, must ultimately fall short of their unrealistic 
goal of attaining complete knowledge of the world, which according to 
Nietzsche, is in fact beyond definitive explanation.  “Theoretical optimism,” 
the belief in the possibility of absolute knowledge, must breakdown when 
rendered ineffectual through encounters with phenomena that defy its 
explanations.  This process of knowledge becoming ineffectual is what 
Nietzsche means when referring to the nihilistic devaluation of values, and 
whether acknowledged or not, it is the decisive moment when “logic twists 
around itself and finally bites itself in the tail.”5 As the cataclysmic event of 
nihilism pervades the entirety of Western history, it precludes authentic 
ecumenical goals from grounding a culture’s formation and forward 
projection.6 
Nietzsche traces the growth of nihilism from Plato’s philosophy of the 
Ideas  (forms) through the dominant interpretation of Plato’s corpus, in the 
form of Platonism, which amounts to a drastic reinterpretation of Plato’s 
original philosophy, wherein Plato’s thought becomes, “more refined, more 
enticing, more incomprehensible,” namely Christian.7 In the modern age, the 
metaphysical interpretation of the “true-apparent” distinction is taken to the 
extreme in the Christian world-view.  Unlike Plato’s teachings, Christianity 
                                                 
3 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 155-156. 
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, Will to Power, trans. by W. Kaufmann and R.  J.  Hollingdale 
(New York: Vintage,1969), Section 2. 
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. by Shaun Whiteside (London: Penguin 
Books, 1993), 75. 
6  Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Philosopher as Cultural Physician,” in Nietzsche and Truth: 
Selection from his Notebooks of the Early 1870’s, trans. by Daniel Breazeale (New Jersey: Humanities 
Press, 1979), 75.  Nietzsche did not believe that an authentic culture could ever be grounded in 
the truths of science or religion.  He even argues that philosophy is also inadequate to the task of 
founding a culture: “It is not possible to base a popular culture on philosophy.  Thus, in relation 
to a culture, philosophy can always be of second, but never of primary significance.” Instead, he 
claims that true culture demands for its unifying center an art or an artwork, and thus envisages 
the artist as the best possible candidate for cultural founder.   
7 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols/The Anti-Christ, trans. by R.  J.  Hollingdale 
(Penguin: London, 1991), 50-51.  
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believes that “true Being” is no longer attainable through corporeal means, e.g., 
the wisdom and piety of the philosopher, and is instead promised in a glorious 
after-life, most specifically to “the sinner who repents.”8 Christianity views 
earthly habitation as something negative, and worse, sinful, something to be 
transcended in order to reach a higher state of existence within the incorporeal 
realm of spirit (super-sensuous).  Christianity denigrates the body, relegating 
the sensuous to a position of lowly rank.  The implications that accompany this 
dualistic metaphysical world view are both epistemological and axiological in 
scope.  According to Nietzsche, with Christianity comes the erroneous and 
pernicious view that the “true world” (truth) relates to the moral valuation of 
“good” and the “apparent world” (falsity) relates to the moral valuation of 
“evil.” 
At the backdrop of this Platonist-Christian (Platonism) privileging of 
the super-sensuous world, Nietzsche attempts to return to the realm of the 
senses which involves an overturning of the Platonic world view.  What ensues 
is a revaluation of the metaphysical standard of truth and an initiation towards 
a “physiological” aesthetics.   At first glance, positivism appears to accomplish 
such a move as described, for positivism inverts Platonism’s value system by 
removing the super-sensuous from a position of importance, no longer 
designating it as “true Being.” In its place, empirical presentation (positum) 
becomes the new “truth” standard of reality.  Nevertheless, positivism is not a 
radical overcoming of Platonism in the Nietzschean sense, for it continues the 
proliferation of nihilism, and like its counterpart, embraces the unnatural 
bifurcation of existence, i.e., the comparative ideal of the “true world” against 
which values are measured and judged.  Although positivism casts aside the 
ideal of the super-sensuous as the “true world,” it retains the ideal of the “true 
world,” and along with it the “blueprint of an ‘above and below.’”9  Positivism 
continues to operate within Platonism’s system of hierarchy.  Empirical 
validation becomes the gold standard establishing the world of “appearances” 
(in this case, the super-sensuous world), as that which constitutes all things 
which are not truly in Being.  Initially, Nietzsche’s undertaking seems to repeat 
the move of positivism, i.e., establishing the “sensual” as the criterion for 
determining “True reality.”  However, Nietzsche does not intend to establish 
an alternative form of positivism by merely reversing the structure of 
knowledge.  Rather, he seeks to attack the root of nihilism, abolishing the 
destructive “essence” of Platonism – the distinction between “true and 
apparent” world. 
In addition to the aforementioned epistemological implications 
associated with attacking the essence of Platonism, for Nietzsche, there are 
crucial physiological and psychological issues that emerge from this analytic 
endeavor, which are directly linked with the concerns of axiology.  Nietzsche 
believes that the overturning of Platonism’s world view rescues the sensate 
realm from its maligned and devalued status, a world linked directly to the 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 50-51. 
9 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 207.  
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corporeal “body,” and elevates it to a place of prominence in a renovated, 
renewed, and re-valued conception of human existence.  As opposed to viewing 
the body as a “phenomenon that accompanies thinking, a phenomenon 
furthermore, that has a rather inhibited effect on the clarity of thinking,”10 
Nietzsche embraces the body as the medium through which thought transpires, 
and beyond, as the ground from out of which all of our activities and advanced 
states of being emerge, from thought and language to the superlative 
transfiguration of our world through art.  Since Nietzsche’s project of re-
valuation is genealogically concerned with a return to the origins of our 
psychological motivations and the values we attach to these psychological 
states, he is ultimately concerned with whether or not the artist’s psychological 
motives to create emerge out of life-affirming drives or life-negating drives, out 
of modes of attunement that are valuable or detrimental to the overall 
enhancement of life’s power.  Clearly, for Nietzsche, Platonism fosters a 
nihilistic environment wherein the creative psychological drives, those 
conducive to the most fecund and efficacious discharge of the will-to-power, 
are subjugated in the service of other-worldly aspirations, and here Nietzsche 
locates the pernicious drive to deny life, which results in the decline and 
atrophy of the will-to-power  and  the  human’s  creative  spirit.                      
Nietzsche envisages the authentic overturning of Platonism as the “zenith” of 
world history, punctuating the “end of the longest error.”11 How is it possible 
to consider this historical event as humankind’s greatest hour given the grave 
implications of the complete overturning of values hitherto? For once the “true 
world” is abolished, so too is the concept of the “apparent world,” and since 
these worlds together form what ultimately “stands opposed to pure 
nothingness,” it follows that nihilism will rise to engulf humanity.  Not so, 
assures Heidegger, for Nietzsche’s philosophy works to overcome nihilism in 
even its most drastic manifestations.  It is during this time that humanity is 
faced with the choice of either remaining passive before nihilism’s oppression 
(the Last Man) or responding actively, in the form of the Übermensch, striving to 
overcome the previous relationship of humanity to its existence.  Although 
often conceived as a super-human entity, the Übermensch is certainly not “some 
miraculous, fabulous being.” Rather, as Heidegger notes, the “overman” is a 
high-bred of the philosopher and artist who surmounts the condition of 
“unsubdued nihilism,” transcending the Last Man, whose “Dasein and relation 
to Being have been determined by Platonism in one of its forms or by a 
mixture of these.”12   The Übermensch response calls for the establishment of 
new values and standards of ground.  This new value-structure receives its 
impetus from the drives of the “biological,” or physiological, that which is 
valued precisely for its benefit to life.  “In valuations,” writes Nietzsche, “are 
expressed  conditions of preservation and growth.”13 Values are ultimately 
                                                 
10 Daniela Vallega-Neu, The Bodily Dimension in Thinking (New York: SUNY, 2005), 21-
37. 
11 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols/The Anti-Christ, 50-51. 
12 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 208. 
13 Nietzsche, Will to Power, Section 507.  
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decided by life as will to power, a perpetual striving and willing of conditions that 
facilitate the unremitting drive to enhance its power. 
According to Heidegger’s interpretation, Nietzsche’s conception of 
“reality” reinstates the sensuous as the basic character of existence, labeling it 
“perspectival-perceptual.”14 Reality consists of a large number of forces 
(perspectives), joined and linked together, striving in contention, each asserting 
a unique perspective and assessing other perspectives in terms of the “capacity 
for life.”15 Each living being has its own configuration of drives, forces, and 
ways of manifesting its presence, of showing, or “shining.”  That which shows 
itself via the sensuous is termed “semblance” (Schein), and this radiating of a 
things’ perspective is part and parcel of the world of appearances (die scheinbare 
Welt).  Bringing the idea of semblance into the essence of reality, Nietzsche 
attempts to expunge the pejorative connotations that the tradition has attached 
to the concept of “appearance.” It is within this new interpretation of reality, 
or “sensuousness,” that the relation between truth and art takes on 
significance.  Grounded in this singular, multi-perceptual reality, each a mode 
of perspectival-shining (Scheinen), truth is conceived as the fixation of 
semblance (Anschein) and art as the scintillating transfiguration of semblance 
(Aufscheinen). 
As Heidegger argues, Nietzsche conceives truth as a “justified and 
necessary condition of the assertion of life.”16  Truth as fixed semblance gives 
rise to the concept of the “object,” i.e., things with a constant and enduring 
quality.  Truth allows beings to establish themselves amid change as they work 
to master the environment.  Although he conceptualizes truth as Anschein 
(apparition), it is not opposed to reality, and instead refers to that which shows 
itself as fixed appearance, securing what the will to power has gathered and 
acquired.   Admittedly, Heidegger claims that Nietzsche holds a unique view of 
truth (e.g., “error,” “illusion,” “metaphor,” “lie”) and is skeptical of 
“theoretical” idealism’s claim to possess the absolute certainty of knowledge, 
i.e., the undying faith in the correspondence model of truth and the ability of 
propositions to accurately picture reality, demonstrating the “adequate 
expression of an object within a subject.”17 However, Heidegger’s contention 
that truth for Nietzsche is determined exclusively by knowledge, and further, 
that Nietzsche’s understanding of truth as “fixed semblance” firmly locates 
him in the company of such philosophers as Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes, 
who concern themselves with truth as demonstrating a constancy in presence, 
representing that which is known because it satisfies the essence of truth, is not 
without contention among commentators. 
In essence, Heidegger claims that for Nietzsche, “Truth is the truth of 
knowledge,” i.e., the truth of what is truly known “is established as something 
true in, by, and for knowledge alone.” (149).   According to Heidegger, as will 
                                                 
14 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 213. 
15 Ibid, 212. 
16 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 215. 
17 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense,” Nietzsche and Truth: Selection 
from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870’s, 86.  
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be addressed, Nietzsche overlooks the greater ontological concern of the 
essence of truth and the truth of essence because he pursues truth strictly in 
terms of epistemology, and much like traditional philosophy, locates truth in 
the domain of knowledge.  It is necessary to interrogate Heidegger’s negligent 
glossing of Nietzsche’s early interpretations of truth (e.g., “Truth and Lies in an 
Non-Moral Sense”), wherein the discourse on truth is actually grounded in the 
philological understanding of rhetoric, semiotics, and the notion of metaphor 
as a supreme form of creative, imaginative linguistic transference.  In these 
early writings Nietzsche espouses a radically skeptical view of the possibility of 
acquiring “truth” as previously conceived by the metaphysical-epistemological 
tradition.  Arguing against Heidegger, Schrift identifies the following aspects of 
Nietzsche’s radical theory of truth, which Schrift claims locates Nietzsche 
outside the aforementioned philosophical tradition: (1) Nietzsche’s critique of 
the referential nature of language and his extreme skepticism toward the 
traditional correspondence model of truth, and (2) Nietzsche’s understanding 
of the aesthetic nature of “truth” as emerging through the creative, imaginative 
use of language.  Importantly, as relating to the purpose of criticizing 
Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche’s understanding of truth, relying as it does on 
the  Nachlass and Will to Power, Schrift states the following: “Nietzsche’s 
reflections on language function as an essential component of his later 
thinking.”18 
For Nietzsche, language constructs the laws of truth, it allows the 
“clever beasts” to invent knowing, but the notion of “truth” in this instance, as 
Nietzsche is careful to point out, is at odds with “truth” as conceived by 
traditional epistemology, i.e., knowledge established through the 
correspondence model, which expresses, by way of a proposition, the valid 
relationship between a subjective “representation” and the objective “state-of-
affairs.” As Schrift points out, the correspondence model works off the 
mistaken assumption that language, “stands in some sort of privileged relation 
(adequatio) to an extralinguistic referent or meaning (‘reality’), i.e., language, that 
which conceptually structures the world in the first instance, holds the power 
to provide us with ‘true’ information about things that are situated outside of 
language.”19 Nietzsche argues against any referential accuracy inherent to 
language, for he believes that an unsurmountable gap exists between words and 
things.  This notion is directly related to Nietzsche’s critique of the 
correspondence model, which operates according to the flawed logic that there 
is an “objective referent” outside the locution, as if it were possible to speak of 
an objective referent outside the metaphorical relationship language establishes.  
As Nietzsche reasons, “We believe that we know something about things 
themselves when speak of trees, colors, snow, and flowers; and yet we possess 
nothing but metaphors for things,”20 and these metaphors do not express a 
relationship of identity between “words” and the original entities.   In order for 
                                                 
18 Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation, 138. 
19 Ibid., 133. 
20 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense,” Philosophy and Truth: Selections 
From Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870's, 83.  
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the correspondence model to have validity, it would need to grant legitimate 
access to the essence of things, the “thing-in-itself,” so that the accuracy with 
which the locution corresponded to this so-called “essence” could be 
determined, and, as Nietzsche claims, this is an impossible feat. 
In “On Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense,” Nietzsche presents an 
analysis of the manner in which human concepts arise as constructs of a 
linguistic nature, most specifically that of metaphor formation.  The process 
can be understood as tripartite in structure, involving a movement, or 
transference, from one realm of perception to another, “a triple metaphorical 
transference from nerve impulse to image to words to concept.”21 According 
to Schrift, since each sphere involves a move from one “language” to another, 
this rules out “a legitimate relation, or literal translation between spheres.”22 
Thus, for Nietzsche, complete descriptive analysis, wherein it is possible to 
determine legitimate truth-value, is impossible.  The concepts we form and 
incorporate in our attempts to know the world are always at a remove from the 
original perceptual experiences that ground the move to abstraction, for even 
at the level of the initial perception, when “a nerve stimulus is transferred into 
image,”23 metaphor formation is at work.  As stated, Nietzsche claims that 
there are no externally valid descriptions of real things, of anything resembling 
the essence of things, because language does not hold the ability to accurately 
capture reality.  “For between two absolutely different spheres,” writes 
Nietzsche, “as between subject and object, there is no causality, no correctness, 
there is at most, an aesthetic relation.”24 Although Heidegger locates Nietzsche 
in the company of such philosophers as Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes, who all 
believe that truth is properly determined by knowledge and that the possibility 
for legitimate knowledge exists, Nietzsche’s radical theory of knowledge 
drastically contradicts the responses the aforementioned philosophers have 
given to the questions concerning the origin, reliability, and criterion for 
knowledge, i.e., the concerns of epistemology proper.  Nietzsche is not only 
skeptical of knowledge in the traditional sense, but is outright nihilistic about 
the possibility of both “gaining knowledge” and the value of the idealized quest 
to attain it.25 
As opposed to the traditional notion of truth that seeks to overcome 
any and all illusions, which settles for nothing less than categorical certainty in 
all matters of truth, Nietzsche adopts a “naturalistic” and “instrumental” 
conception of truth.  As described by Daniel Breazeale, this is the 
understanding that the human requires the aid of “life preserving fictions, 
which apparently must be believed to be true if they are to serve their intended 
function.”26  However, “believing” these life preserving fictions is not the same 
                                                 
21 Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation, 132. 
22 Ibid., 126. 
23 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense,” Philosophy and Truth: Selections 
From Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the 1870's, 82. 
24 Ibid., 86. 
25 Ibid., 27, (trans. bylator  Daniel Breazeale’s Comments). 
26 Ibid, 33.    
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as investing them with objective, categorical truth-value.  Nietzsche is clear that 
we must at all times be aware that their production requires the equating of 
unequal things, based as they are on the metaphorical transference from one 
perceptual realm to another.  To the point, such truths are nothing but lies and 
illusions we that we as humans create.27 Viewed in this manner, truths are as 
illusory and false as lies, however, if we attend to Nietzsche’s “naturalist 
conception” and its utility for human life, we understand that “some products 
of the intellect are more valuable (“truer”) than others.”28 Ultimately, as argued 
by Schrift, Nietzsche concludes that knowledge is “merely a collection of 
perspectival illusions which, while necessary for the preservation of the human 
species, stands as a function not of truth [epistemology] but of power,” or value.  
Truth, for Nietzsche, much unlike the tradition within which he is located by 
Heidegger, becomes a concern for axiology  rather than a function of 
epistemology.29 
Heidegger’s metaphysical reading argues that Nietzsche’s intimation of 
the all-important question of Being qua  Being occurs in the strategic 
reconciling of art and truth in the realm of “art,” wherein truth as “fixed 
semblance” facilitates the will to power in its quest to overcome and 
transfigure life (as  fixed semblance, or “truth”).  However, such an 
interpretation appears to overlook the crucial issue that art is in fact situated at 
the root of Nietzsche’s theory of truth as metaphor formation, i.e., truth as a 
byproduct of language is always already art in that it is metaphorical, 
imaginative, and creative.  As Nietzsche writes, “The drive toward the 
formation of metaphors is the fundamental human drive,”30 and this drive is 
artistic, plain and simple.  According to Nietzsche, the human being is to be 
admired for its artistic powers, for it is a “genius of construction.” Whereas 
other animals create their habitat with materials they collect, “man builds with 
the far more delicate conceptual material which he first has to manufacture for 
himself.”31 Nietzsche believes that the entire conceptual schemata of the world 
is born through the artistic process of metaphor construction, which streams 
from “the primal faculty of human imagination like a fiery liquid.”32 However, 
as Nietzsche astutely observes, many are unable to come to terms with the fact 
that the human artist creates its world by way of “anthropomorphic” concepts 
that do not capture anything resembling the “true essence” of things.   
According to Nietzsche, outside of the human being, no objective truths exist, 
and tradition philosophy ignores this, forgets this, and must do so in order to 
preserve its “self-consciousness,” in order to retain its sanity and security in the 
                                                 
27 Ibid, 33.   
28 Nietzsche, Philosophy and Truth: Selection From Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870's, 
32, (trans. bylator Daniel Breazeale’s Analysis). 
29 Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation, 138. 
30 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense,” Philosophy and Truth: Selection 
From Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870's, 88. 
31 Ibid, 85. 
32 Ibid.,86.  
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false and dangerous belief that the world can be known with utter certainty 
through knowledge.33 
For Nietzsche, thought is possible only by way of language, “semiotic 
unities and syntactical categories,”34 which gives order to the world and 
structures our understanding of it.  The artistic process of giving form to our 
world through language does not end with the formation of concepts.  Rather, 
this moment is in fact the origin of the life-long process of artistic world 
creation, transformation, and self-overcoming.  As Nietzsche points out, if we 
are able to recognize and accept that our worldly conceptual framework is 
indeed nothing beyond a creative “illusion,” i.e., as long as we are able to 
momentarily deceive “ourselves without injury” in matters of truth,  then we 
are free for additional creative acts, free to celebrate our “Saturnalia” in artistic 
world transfiguration.  When the will to power is engaged in the highest task of 
life, as related to the theme of metaphor formation, graduating beyond the 
originary phase of concept formation, we are as artists once again playing with 
metaphor, and we derive pleasure in this play which displaces “the boundary 
stones of abstraction.”35 When remaking the world as an aesthetic 
phenomenon, Nietzsche claims that we are “guided by intuition rather than 
concepts,”36 so in essence, we are transforming and overcoming through 
artistic creation that which we ourselves have originally constructed through 
language.  By dismantling the conceptual framework and reassembling it “in an 
ironic fashion, pairing the most alien things and separating the closest,” we are 
exercising the artistic drive to refashion the world of our own “aesthetic” 
making.37 Thus, against Heidegger’s interpretation, it seems that prior to the 
will to power overcoming and transforming though artistic activity that which 
is gathered as “fixed semblance,” there is an artist always already at work in an 
originary sense, creating through metaphor formation the conceptual edifice of 
the world, making possible to powerful discharge of will to power in higher-
level aesthetic activity, making possible anything like the interpretation of truth 
as “fixed semblance” in the first place.38 
                                                 
33 Nietzsche, “On the Pathos of Truth,” Philosophy and Truth: Selection From Nietzsche’s 
Notebooks of the Early 1870's, 66.  This so-called “drive for knowledge,” for Nietzsche, represents 
the inevitable withering and death of the human’s “will to art,” the will to overcome existence.  
For as Nietzsche philosophizes, “whereas knowledge attains as it final goal” in annihilation, i.e., 
the petrification of existence, “art is always more powerful than knowledge - because it desires 
life.”      
34 Ibid., 30 (trans. bylator Daniel Breazeale’s Analysis). 
35 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Context, Philosophy and Truth: Selection 
From Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1870's, 90. 
36 Ibid., 90. 
37 Ibid., 90. 
38 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Non-moral Sense,” Philosophy and Truth: 
Nietzsche’s Early Notebooks From the Early 1870's, 84.  In relation to this discussion on truth and art 
as metaphor formation, it appears that for Nietzsche, the realm of knowledge is not the domain 
of truth as conceived by the tradition, but rather, truth seems to reside in a realm of artistic 
intuition, where truth is defined in terms of rhetorical tropes: “What is truth? A movable host of 
metaphors, metonymies, and anthropomorphisms: In short, a sum of human relations which 
have been poetically and rhetorically intensified, transferred, and embellished.”    
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Returning to Heidegger’s analysis and the interrelation he establishes 
in Nietzsche’s philosophy between art and truth, Heidegger suggests the 
following: Traditional philosophy embraces truth as life’s ultimate guiding 
principle, for as the logic runs, humans require truth in order to have a 
meaningful life.  Is it not right to demand that life, in the first instance, be 
grounded and guided by truth in all of its aspects? Nietzsche vehemently 
opposes such logic.  Truth, he argues, is but one aspect of existence.  It is 
correct that life necessitates its own preservation, but also, and more 
importantly, life requires enhancement in order to perpetually grow out beyond 
itself.  Therefore, according to Nietzsche, a life dedicated solely to the pursuit 
and acquisition of truth leads to the stagnation and decay of life, as historical 
nihilism testifies.  Truth inhibits life’s drive to continually increase its power, 
and so it is art, rather than truth, which opens the possibility of its ultimate 
enhancement.  For this reason Nietzsche proclaims, “We possess art lest we 
perish from the truth.”39 
Art is the most “transparent”40 configuration of will to power, as 
expressed by the artist in the act of creation.  In its most organic capacity, art 
transfigures life, making it stronger, richer, and more perfect,41 effectively 
opening up life for the creation of more life.  Although the expression of will 
to power reaches its apex in the artist, Nietzsche does not limit his conception 
of aesthetics to the production of literature, music, or plastic art.  Rather, he 
protracts the traditional notion of art, defining creative activity as the basic 
function of all living beings.  Art clarifies semblance by locating a “thing in the 
clarity of Being, and establishing such clarity as the heightening of life itself.”42 
As “will to semblance,” art idealizes and embellishes reality, causing it to “shine 
most profoundly and supremely in scintillating transfiguration.”43 Art is worth 
more than truth44 because it stands closer in metaphysical proximity to life’s 
innermost nature as will to power, “an expression for the Being of 
Becoming.”45 Art is the principal facilitator of this essence, akin to life as a 
dynamic ever-changing phenomenon, and as such, more valuable and necessary 
to life than truth as fixed semblance. 
Art is the secularized “spiritualization of the senses,”46 and as such, a 
powerful spiritual force once liberated from the tyranny of the religious 
conscience.  When referring to art as “physiological,” Nietzsche is not 
restricting the concept to the expression of base sensuality, that is, symbolic 
                                                 
39 Nietzsche, Will to Power, Section 822. 
40 Ibid., Section 797.  Nietzsche’s aphorism runs thus: “The phenomenon of ‘artist’ is 
still the most transparent – to see through it to the basics instincts of power, nature, etc.!” This is 
to say, as articulated within the “grand style,” that the highest form of creative activity, the artist 
is not only expressing most obviously the will to power in action, he/she is also, and more 
importantly, expressing the will to power in its most powerful and effective configuration.     
41 Ibid., Section 808. 
42 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 216. 
43 Ibid., 161.   
44 Nietzsche, Will to Power, Section 853. 
45 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 233.  (trans. bylator David Krell’s Analysis). 
46 Nietzsche, Will to Power, Section 820.    
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only of the libidinous urges at work in nature, for art is best understood as a 
physiological-psychical phenomenon, encompassing both sensuous and “non-
sensuous” aspects of life, an amalgam of mind, body, and spirit.  Inducing 
semblance to scintillate, art yields a mystical glimpse into an idealized, 
perfected reality, the world is brought forth to appear in such a way that it is 
“embellished.” The scintillating transfiguration of existence occurs when artist 
and spectator are attuned within the aesthetic mood (Stimmung) of Rausch, or, as 
David Krell translates this term, the “attunement of rapture.” This is the 
intoxicated “feeling of plentitude and enhancement of force,”47 which 
influences and determines one’s stance to Being as a whole.  Rausch awakens 
the capacity in beings to extend, or project, their Being out beyond itself in 
transcendence, experiencing a “relation to Being in which beings themselves 
are experienced as being made more full in Being, richer, more perspicuous, 
more essential.”48 
Nietzsche identifies the embellishing power of art as “Love.”  This is a 
dual reference to the sexual and spiritual elements of the aesthetic attunement 
of  Rausch.  Love facilitates art’s transformation of the world, in all of its 
terrifying and uncertain aspects, into something to be affirmed.  Love 
represents “the highest state of affirmation of existence,” and in this state of 
existence even the “highest degrees of pain”49 are not excluded, and in fact 
willed.  When Nietzsche describes the aesthetic enthusiasm of Love’s 
attunement as a form of “divination,” the classic characteristics of the mystic 
(religious) experience are undeniable.  Within Love’s intoxication, “the 
sensations of time and space are altered,” “tremendous distances are surveyed” 
50 and effortlessly apprehended, as the power of understanding is immeasurably 
enhanced.  Such an ecstatic experience directs “life out beyond itself,” 
creatively communicating to life a new possibility of its higher law.”51  Whereas 
religion once served as redemptive justification for human existence, it is for 
Nietzsche art that reveals life’s highest possibilities.  As the secular-spiritual 
liberator of the sufferer, the man of action, and the man of knowledge,52 art is the 
only authentic means of justifying existence.     
As articulated, despite the fact that art and truth are both necessary for 
life, as modes of perspectival-shining, it is art, due to its powers of creative 
transfiguration that is significantly more valuable to life than truth.  Nietzsche’s 
talk of the “discordance” (Zwiespalt) between art and truth is to be understood 
within this line of reasoning.  Heidegger conceives discordance as the severing 
in two of forces emerging from a common origin, possible “only where the 
elements which sever the unity of their belonging-together diverge from one 
another by virtue of that very unity.”53 It is for the sake of life’s continued 
                                                 
47 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 105. 
48 Ibid., pg.  100. 
49 Nietzsche, Will to Power, Section 852. 
50 Ibid., Section 800. 
51 Hiedegger, Nietzsche, 126.   
52 Nietzsche Will to Power, Section 853. 
53 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 217.  
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enhancement that these two modes of existence must diverge and run counter 
to each other.  As Heidegger explains, art and truth must split in discordant 
opposition to ensure the continual growth and ascendancy of life: 
 
In order for the real (the living creature) to be real, it must 
on the one hand ensconce itself within a particular 
horizon, thus perduring in the illusion of truth.  But in 
order for the real to remain real, it must on the other hand 
simultaneously transfigure itself by going beyond itself, 
surpassing itself in the scintillation of what is created in 
art – and that means it has to advance against the truth.54  
 
Nietzsche explicitly states that the relationship between art and truth 
arouses “holy dread.”55 Is it possible to find such discordance elsewhere in the 
annals of philosophy, most specifically within the works of Plato? Heidegger 
pursues this line of inquiry for the following reason: If Nietzsche’s philosophy 
is to be considered the authentic “inversion,” or overturning, of Platonism, a 
similar discordance, “but of a reverse sort,”56 must be found in Plato’s thought 
(recall that the doctrine of the Ideas originally spawned Platonism’s nihilistic 
domination).57 Attempting to locate this discordance, Heidegger examines the 
dialogues of Plato, searching out the center of Plato’s metaphysics and the 
conception of Being as eidos, or the Ideas, Heidegger reads the Republic and the 
Phaedrus with the intent to first, clarify Plato’s definition art, Being, and truth; 
and next, to explore the context in which the question of truth and art arises, 
asking: In what way is art related to the truth of Being within Plato’s 
philosophy? Is this relationship of a discordant nature? 
Plato theorizes that the Ideas make up the constitutive nature of 
existence, and such a hypothesis “presupposes the interpretation of truth as 
aletheia,”58 i.e., truth as the “unconealment,” or the revelation, of Being.  Within 
Plato’s thought, truth and Being share an intimate bond.  Since Heidegger 
wants to understand art as it relates to the truth of the Being, he must first 
work to ascertain the notion of art as defined by Plato.  Although the ancient 
Greeks did not employ a single, all-encompassing term when referring to “art,” 
they did embrace a comprehensive definition of art’s nature – all art was 
categorized as mimesis, or “imitation,” a form of representation in art.  That 
                                                 
54 Ibid,  217  
55 Ibid., 142.  Highlighting important discordance between art and truth, Heidegger 
includes a quotation from Nietzsche’s writings of 1888.  Reflecting on the 1872 publication of 
the Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche states, “Very early in my life I took the question of the relation of 
art and truth seriously: And even now I stand in holy dread in the face of this discordance.” 
56  Heidegger, Nietzsche, 181. 
57  Ibid., 163.  Heidegger’s questioning seeks not only to uncover the conflict between 
truth (or true Being) and art (or what is portrayed in art) within Plato’s philosophy, but also 
works to assist in locating Nietzsche within the history of philosophy - For only by searching out 
this relationship between art and truth in philosophy’s history, will “Nietzsche’s basic 
metaphysical position in its own light” come to shine.    
58 Ibid., I82.     
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which is properly “real” in Plato’s philosophy manifests the Ideas in varying 
degrees within outward appearance, and this occurs in either one of three 
forms of self-showing and ways of being produced.  Plato ranks the three 
modes of production in terms of their effective capacity to facilitate the 
uncovering of Being.  “With regard to ways of production and in light of the 
pure outward appearance, Being,”59  mimesis  is defined by its metaphysical 
“distance” from Being. 
In order to properly grasp Plato’s notion of art, or techne, as the Greeks 
understood the knowledge leading to the creation of artefacts, the notion of 
the world-creator in relation to the craftsperson must be elucidated.  According 
to Plato’s cosmogony it is god (demiourgos) who makes the kosmos as the ultimate 
giver of shape to all things.  Working with the forms (eidos), Plato’s god holds 
in readiness the emergence of Being’s pure outward appearance in order that 
the human, for example, the craftsperson, who produces things according to 
the essence of their Being, is able to discern it.  The craftsperson is situated on 
the second tier of Plato’s hierarchy of “Being.” This because the things that are 
produced, made for the sake of the people and state (demos), with the explicit 
purpose of everyday use, illuminates the truth of the Ideas.  The artist, who 
produces only imitations of things, is thrice removed from god and true Being, 
as the artist possesses neither god’s disposition over pure essence, nor the 
disposition over and use of what she produces with respect to what it is, in the 
manner of the craftsperson.  Rather than clarifying and making possible the 
revelation of Being, the artist’s creation inhibit aletheia.  Due to art’s medium 
and its methods of copying, transforming, and inventing, it is “exposed to the 
danger of continual deception and falsehood.”60 Art, as mimesis, is therefore far 
removed from the truth of Being, revealing the metaphor of “distance” in 
Plato’s thought.  This idea is not readily translatable into a discernable 
discordance, which requires thinking art on a par with truth, i.e., as beings of 
equal significance arising from a common origin.61 However, the conception of 
art as presented within the Republic does not constitute Plato’s entire position 
on art and beauty, and so Heidegger turns his attention to the Phaedrus, and it is 
within this dialogue, amid reflections on beauty, truth, and the soul that he 
uncovers the subtle discordance between art and truth to which Plato alludes. 
According to Plato, human comportment presupposes the latent 
understanding of Being.  Since Being for Plato is a non-sensuous phenomenon, 
it cannot be apprehended by the senses, and this indicates that the “soul,” or 
psyche, the immaterial, immortal faculty by which humankind comprehend the 
Ideas, must have at one time viewed the radiant truth of Being.  The soul, 
however, is estranged from the truth of the Ideas as subject to the inevitable 
cycle of rebirth within the human body.  As follows, within its corporeal 
habitation, the soul’s understanding of Being is covered over, concealed 
beneath the surface of everyday appearances.  This for Plato represents the 
                                                 
59 Ibid., 185. 
60 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 168. 
61 Ibid., 189  
 
 
J.  MAGRINI     129 
 
fundamental source of humanity’s problems.  Falling prey to appearances 
(aistheta) and the common opinions concerning appearances (doxa), humans 
descend into the oblivion of Being and exist within a state of forgetfulness, 
completely unaware that such a thing as Being exists.  In order to acquire, or 
more accurately, return to, an explicit understanding of Being, i.e., recognizing 
that the Ideas are the direct cause of sensible appearances, a recollection of 
Being (anamnesis) must occur, and it is beauty that makes such a recovery of 
Being possible. 
Although neither the production of art nor the work itself allows the 
radiance of Being to shine forth, it is within art’s capacity to profoundly affect 
the observer that Plato locates the means by which to facilitate aletheia, or the 
disclosure of the Ideas.  Beauty captivates through scintillating, sensuous 
appearance, liberating to the “view upon Being,”62 i.e., granting humans entry 
into the immediacy of the sensory appearances while simultaneously drawing 
them beyond the realm of the sensuous to the realm of the super-sensuous.  By 
way of beauty’s entrancing power, the fleeting, radiant glimpse of Being is 
arrested from the outward appearance of things.  Beauty and truth belong 
together, as they are related to Being, both are essential to the revelation of the 
Ideas within Plato’s philosophy, “for that which truth essentially brings about, 
the unveiling of Being, that and nothing else is what beauty brings about.”63 
Yet this belonging together of beauty and truth is transitory in Plato’s thought, 
for although beauty opens the truth of Being, it is an “aesthetic” phenomenon, 
arising in the realm of the sensuous, and Being for Plato is always non-
sensuous.  For this reason, despite beauty’s facilitation of aletheia, the opening, 
or “disclosure” of Being occurs, in a strict sense, at the site of what Plato 
deems the realm of “non-being” (me on)—through the medium of sensation, in 
the realm of the sensuous.  It is therefore necessary that beauty and truth 
diverge from each other.   
 
When we consider very carefully that art, by bringing 
forth the beautiful, resides in the sensuous, and that it is 
therefore far removed from truth, it then becomes clear 
why truth and beauty, their belonging together in one 
notwithstanding, still must be two, must separate from 
one another.  But the severance, discordance in the broad 
sense, is not in Plato’s view on that arouses dread; it is a 
felicitous one.  The beautiful elevates us beyond the 
sensuous and bears us back into the true.64  
 
Heidegger establishes that Plato, much the same as Nietzsche, thinks 
art and truth in terms of their relationship to life, or Being, as emerging from 
out of a common origin.  This fact is crucial to Heidegger’s exegesis of 
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Nietzsche’s philosophy, because discordance, as denoted by Heidegger, is 
possible only when art and truth are thought in terms of “abscission,” i.e., 
growing from common ground and then branching off, one from the other.  In 
locating the subtle, “felicitous” discordance between art and truth within 
Plato’s philosophy, Heidegger reveals the exact type of discordance required to 
substantiate his claim that Nietzsche’s philosophy is best understood as an 
inverted, or reversed, form of Platonism. 
To understand why, in Nietzsche’s philosophy, the interaction of art 
and truth arouses dread, the moment of Platonism’s abolition must be 
analyzed, for at this time in history, along with the eradication of the “true” 
and “apparent” worlds, the monumental occurrence of God’s death hits with 
full force.65 When God, morality, philosophy, and science no longer guarantee 
a complete understanding of existence in terms that are categorical, humanity is 
forced to assume responsibility for its own existence.  Art receives its vital 
impetus from these events, and creative activity, as metaphysical activity, comes 
into its own for the first time.  “Existence,” states Nietzsche, “can now be 
endured on within creation,”66 for art is “the only superior configuration to all 
will to the denial of life (nihilism).”67  Within a world devoid of transcendent 
values, the will to power conducts itself in creation, and art, the greatest 
stimulant to life, the most “transparent” configuration of will to power, 
emerges as the only legitimate means by which humanity enacts its life.  In 
assuming responsibility for its own Being, at the peak of nihilism, i.e., the 
moment when God’s death hits with full force, humanity is inextricably 
trapped within the discordant relationship of art and truth.  The discordance 
between art and truth rages in so far as it continually induces “dread,”68 that is 
to say, in the desperate times of nihilism, locked within the relentless cycle of 
art and truth, humanity is repeatedly thrown back upon its own self-reliant 
means.  Nietzsche’s rallying cry, “Art and nothing but art,”69 serves as a harsh, 
yet inspirational reminder to humanity that in the midst of Becoming, forever 
creating and reassessing existence, it must continually rise to the task of living 
in an authentically creative manner. 
If Nietzsche is to succeed in abolishing (overturning) Platonism, the 
overturning “must become a twisting free of it,”70 i.e., his thought must properly 
break free from the conceptual fetters of metaphysics.  This, argues Heidegger, 
is precisely what Nietzsche fails to accomplish, because he remains locked 
within the conceptual scheme of Western philosophy.  Consequently, 
Nietzsche’s ideas on Being, Becoming, and truth develop in the light of 
metaphysics as the result of asking the same question that has guided 
philosophy since its beginnings.  Avoiding the ultimate (grounding) question of 
philosophy (What is Being?), which is concerned with the essence of Being, he 
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instead asks only the penultimate (guiding) question (What is the being?), 
inquiring into the truth of beings, or the Being of beings.  Pursuing the “non-
essential” route, Nietzsche employs the identical system of conceptualization 
that has for centuries directed philosophical inquiry.  Both Being and 
Becoming are thought to determine the ground of beings as such.  On the one 
hand, Nietzsche conceives “Being” as  that which “shows itself” as fixed 
appearance, or presence (ousia), as the ground of that which is, and this 
represents the meaning of truth according to the tradition.  On the other hand, 
he conceives “Becoming” as change (genesis), that which is coming into 
existence and passing away.  The fact that he envisages art, as the ultimate 
expression of Becoming, i.e., the transfiguration of that which shows itself in 
appearance, will emerge as integral to Heidegger’s claim that Nietzsche is the 
“last” of the metaphysicians. 
Heidegger claims that Nietzsche conceives the fundamental character 
of beings, i.e., the Being of beings, as will to power.  As an unquenchable drive 
to grow in strength, will to power is both “willing” and “Becoming.”71 It is not 
enough to simply conceive will to power as Becoming, for according to 
Heidegger’s analysis, Nietzsche philosophizes the notion that Becoming only is 
Becoming in an authentic sense, if it is grounded in Being, therefore he seeks 
to attach a sense of permanence to Becoming in order to legitimize it.   
Nietzsche moves to “impose upon Becoming the character of Being,” which is 
the ultimate will to power, and that “everything recurs is the closest 
approximation to a world of Becoming to a world of Being.”72 Such reasoning 
conveys the interconnectedness of will to power and the “eternal recurrence of 
the same,” as expressed in the metaphysical terms of the “what” and “how” of 
existence, i.e., the essentia, or “what” of beings, as will to power, and the 
existentia, or “how” of beings as eternal recurrence of the same.  Will to power 
is the Being of beings, a Becoming that wills its return (Being) as Becoming in 
the form of the eternal recurrence.  “Being as permanence,” writes Heidegger, 
“is to let Becoming be a Becoming.”73 Being, as the constancy of form, endures 
throughout the change and flux of Becoming, and such a conception of fixed 
and “enduring” presence (ousia) is to be found within his idea of truth.   
According to Heidegger, although Nietzsche boldly attempts to creatively 
rethink the original unity of Being and Becoming, he nonetheless retains the 
oppositional nature of their “original” relationship as established by 
metaphysics. 
When asking the penultimate  (guiding) question, Nietzsche is 
simultaneously asking, “What is true?” Not formally concerned with the essence 
of truth, he is inquiring into the grounds of beings along the traditional path of 
path of epistemology.74 Unconcerned with the all-important primordial 
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phenomenon of truth as “uncovering,”75 the tradition leaps over the primordial 
conditions necessary for a thing to reveal itself in the first instance.  Heidegger 
traces this mistake to the failure to articulate the question of Being qua Being.  
However, in Heidegger’s view, Nietzsche is not merely another astute 
metaphysical thinker, but is instead the last, and perhaps, greatest of the 
metaphysicians, who gathers and completes the tradition.76 How is it that 
Nietzsche’s philosophy brings to a close the thought of Plato, Aristotle, and 
more, the entire Western metaphysical tradition? Heidegger argues that 
Nietzsche distinguishes himself “within” the tradition by intimating and 
projecting philosophical concerns, which are beyond the frontiers of 
metaphysics.  To address this concern, Heidegger attends to the “unthought,” 
that which remains “unsaid” in Nietzsche’s philosophy.77 The unthought is not 
something that Nietzsche forgets, or neglects to think.  Rather, it is the source 
from which the entirety of his thought emerges and develops.  This for 
Nietzsche is the concern with the ground of beings, the Being of beings as a 
whole.  Heidegger reveals Nietzsche’s unique status within metaphysics by 
carefully reading in correlation (1) the two questions that drive philosophical 
thought and (2) the discordant relationship of art and truth as argued by 
Nietzsche. 
Both the penultimate question of philosophy (What is the being?) and 
the ultimate question (What is Being?) ask, in an elemental way, “What is?” 
Heidegger argues that the verb “is” breaks open the scope of the inquiry to 
include beings as a whole and Being itself, not even the concept of 
“Nothingness” remains outside the inquiry.  This despite the specific focus of 
each respective question.  As a result, writes Heidegger, “Beings are brought 
into the open region itself, and Being is conducted into the region of its 
essence,” 78 i.e., into the openness of aletheia.  When asking the grounding and 
guiding questions of Being and beings, “we are also asking simultaneously and 
inherently about essence of truth.” Thus, both questions ask what beings and 
Being in “truth” are, entailing the concern with the “essence” of truth, and the 
truth of “essence.” Beings in their truth are determined by will to power, and 
this names the Being of beings in truth, therefore the “question concerning 
                                                 
75 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time.  trans. by., J.  Macquarrie & E.  Robinson (New 
York: Harper, 1962), 220/263. 
76 Heidegger, Nietzsche, 4. 
77 Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation, 15.  With respect to Nietzsche’s 
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truth, i.e., the question of the essence of truth, must always be inserted into the 
interpretation of beings as will to power.”79 Since Being and truth are not 
simply peripherally related, Heidegger must think Being and truth together, 
thus he moves to identify the realm, or “domain,” in which they converge, or 
presence in relation.  It is within the analysis of the raging discordance between 
art and truth that Heidegger locates the “domain” in which will to power 
(Being) and truth meet within Nietzsche’s philosophy, and as against the 
tradition, they come together in the realm of art, not in the realm of knowledge 
(epistemology). 
According to David Krell, Hediegger’s implication is that, “although 
Nietzsche does not formalize the question of essence of truth, he removes ‘the 
true’ from the realm of knowledge to the domain of art,” 80 and then goes 
further, in a radical move that decisively establishes him as the last, great 
“metaphysician.”  When proclaiming that art is worth more to life than truth, 
Nietzsche, for the first time within philosophy’s long metaphysical history, 
intimates the awareness of the concern for what Being of truth, or the essence 
of Being, is.  When Being and truth converge in the realm of art, it is truth that 
must ultimately be subordinated to the concerns of Being.  Truth, as conceived 
by the tradition, can never have the final word in the matter, for when 
conceiving life as a growing, ascending phenomenon, and art as the highest 
expression of the Being of beings as will to power, the truth of knowledge 
must always remain secondary to the more primeval, profound, and essential 
truth of Being.  Reviewing Nietzsche’s thoughts on art, truth, and life, within 
the new “sensuousness,” along with attending to the “unthought” source of his 
philosophy, Heidegger determines the “oversights” present to Nietzsche’s 
philosophy to be unlike any of his predecessors.  Nietzsche gathers and 
completes metaphysical inquiry because his thought indicates a concern for 
philosophy’s need to redirect its inquiry and return to what has been forgotten 
within traditional metaphysics, i.e., the focus on the most primordial aspect of 
existence (Being qua Being), that which cannot be derived from anything else, 
and that which is prior to all else.  Nietzsche is something of a herald, giving a 
sign or implication of what is to come, hinting at the essential move toward the 
formalization of the concern with Being, truth, and essence – namely toward 
what Heidegger refers to in Being and Time as “fundamental ontology,”81 and 
herein lies the most important aspect of Nietzsche’s philosophy as presented 
by Heidegger.   For Heidegger seems to suggest that Nietzsche recognizes, 
albeit implicitly, as expressed through Nietzsche’s “unthought,” the primordial 
connection between truth and Being. 
Heidegger’s interpretation explicitly locates Nietzsche within the 
tradition of the metaphysical thinkers who: (1) understand truth as belonging 
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to the realm of epistemology, and (2) limit their philosophical inquiry into the 
Being of beings.  There are several problems with this interpretation, which 
result fromHeidegger’systematic and inauthentic “metaphysicalization”of 
Nietzsche.82 This occurs, as argued by Schrift, because Heidegger adopts 
stringent and highly restrictive methodological choices for approaching 
Nietzsche.  Heidegger’s hermeneutic interpretation is limited from the outset, 
and in essence, amounts to a reading of Nietzsche’s text in which Heidegger 
reads “his own view of the history of philosophy in order to tell us what 
Nietzsche really meant and what he really thought.”83 The three methodological 
choices that structure and guide Heidegger’s reading are outlined by Schrift as 
follows: (1) Heidegger focuses only on Nietzsche’s unpublished Nachlass and 
the sections appearing under the heading, Will to Power and “the conception of 
the ‘unsaid’ as it unfolds in his reading of Nietzsche”84; (2) Heidegger holds the 
belief that Nietzsche, like all metaphysical thinkers, thinks one and only one 
thought, and his thought is about “beings as a whole.” Since Heidegger seeks 
to systematize the self-proclaimed “unsystematic” thinker, “Nietzsche thinks 
his one and only thought, Heidegger tells us, as the thought of the Eternal 
Recurrence of the Same,”85 the supposed center of Nietzsche’s metaphysics; 
and (3) Heidegger holds the view that all serious philosophical thinking is 
metaphysical thinking, and, as a serious thinker, Nietzsche is thus attempting to 
answer the traditional metaphysical question of what beings are. 
Because these methodological choices structure and severely limit 
Heidegger’s reading, severe consequences follow, and Schrift argues that 
Heidegger’s “dogmatic” interpretation fails in many ways to due justice to the 
richness, diversity and even the contradictory nature of Nietzsche’s vast corpus 
of both published and unfinished manuscripts, for all of “Nietzsche’s 
psychological, anthropological, and axiological (aesthetics, ethical) insights are 
subsumed under the rubric of metaphysics.”86 I t  i s co r r e c t  t o  q u e s t i o n  t h e  
validity and accuracy of Heidegger’s reading the will to power in terms of a 
metaphysical phenomenon that determines the ground of beings as a whole.  
For example, as Schrift correctly points out, Heidegger classifies post-Cartesian 
metaphysics as “voluntaristic,” wherein the concept of “will” determines the 
being of beings, and Heidegger locates Nietzsche in this metaphysical tradition 
which “stretches from Schopenhauer through Hegel, Schelling, and Kant to its 
inception in Leibniz.”87 Such an interpretation seems inaccurate, for it is 
questionable whether Nietzsche’s understanding of the “will” is identical with 
the concept of “will” found in Schopenhauer.  For Nietzsche states explicitly 
that the will is an erroneous and false notion that arises as a fiction of grammar 
when we take up a “popular prejudice” and exaggerate it by unifying a 
multiplicity of drives, emotions, and affects into a single immutable source, or 
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substance.  As the following passage from Beyond Good and Evil illustrates, 
Nietzsche clearly espouses a view of the will that is unlike that of 
Schopenhauer: “Willing seems to me to be above all something complicated, 
something that is a unity only as a word.”88 
It is the case that Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil was one of the many 
published works that Heidegger fails to subject to his critical analysis, but as 
Schrift astutely demonstrates, there are numerous passages in Will to Power 
wherein Nietzsche is explicitly arguing against the existence of the will 
conceived in metaphysical terms.  It is not that Heidegger ignores or glosses 
over these passages in Will to Power, rather, it is Heidegger’s close-reading, 
guided as it is by the aforementioned methodological presuppositions, that 
literally “produces” a metaphysical interpretation of the will in Nietzsche’s 
thought.  For example, in Will to Power, Nietzsche interrogates the general 
make-up of will to power, questioning outright whether or not it is a 
metaphysical phenomenon or something else: “Is ‘will to power’ a kind of ‘will’ 
or identical with the concept ‘will’? Is it the same thing as desiring? Or 
commanding? Is it that ‘will’ of which Schopenhauer said it was the ‘in-itself of 
things’?” Nietzsche responds to these queries in the following manner, which 
contains a definitive anti-metaphysical tone: “My proposition is: that the will of 
psychology [also the will of metaphysics] hitherto is an unjustified 
generalization, that this will does not exist at all,” and, as Nietzsche continues, 
what Schopenhauer calls “will” is a “mere empty word.”89 Schrift concludes 
that in this instance Heidegger reads Nietzsche’s rejection of the  “will to 
psychology” as representing “ipso facto a rejection of all psychological inquiries 
into the will.” Such a reading, “opens the way for [Heidegger’s] reduction of 
Nietzsche’s psychology to metaphysics and his consideration of will to power 
exclusively as a metaphysical concept.”90 
In Heidegger’s reading of will to power as the Being of beings there 
remains in Nietzsche’s philosophy a bifurcation of existence, Being is 
juxtaposed with the notion of becoming, and this latter notion, importantly, is 
ever-pervasive in Nietzsche’s thought.  Just as in the foregoing analysis of the 
“will” in Nietzsche, with respect to the concept of “Being” in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy, we encounter a problem created by the prejudiced reading of 
Heidegger.  Much like the notion of will, with respect to Being, “Nietzsche 
makes no such assertion of the enduring presence of will to power,” as 
“Being,” as ousia,91 nor does Nietzsche endorse a dualistic view of existence as 
found in traditional metaphysics.  For in describing the so-called “zenith of 
mankind,” Nietzsche ponders the state of the “apparent world” once the “real 
world” has been done away with, “What world is left? The apparent world 
perhaps? . . . But no! With the real world we have also abolished the apparent 
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world.”92 And again, in The Will to Power, Nietzsche outlines and criticizes the 
“corrupt” motives underlying the quests of both Christianity and Western 
metaphysics to seek a world, a second world, that lies beyond what presents 
itself as “reality,” a world beyond as will, “as if outside the actual world, that of 
becoming, there was another world of being.”93 By subscribing to the false 
notion of “Being,” humans betray their lack of historical sense, and, motivated 
by instincts of fear rather than a “pessimism of strength,” they cast Being as 
eternal presence, “a concept whose origins resides in the human being’s 
inability to feel secure in the ever-changing play of the world.”94 According to 
Nietzsche, philosophers search for this elusive, nonexistent realm of Being, 
postulating a true world behind the world of appearance, which for Nietzsche 
is the only legitimate reality, because they tremble before the Heraclitean 
notion of endless becoming, change, and flux.  As argued by Schrift, if we 
attend to what Nietzsche actually “said,” “thought,” and published, we 
encounter a philosopher reminiscent of Heraclitus, who denied absolute Being, 
permanence and unity, absolute substance, the very notion of Being that 
permeates the history of metaphysical philosophy. 
In subsuming Nietzsche’s psychology to the realm of metaphysics, 
Heidegger’s interpretation covers over the importance of Nietzsche’s 
“genealogical” method, which is described by Nehamas in the following 
manner, “Genealogy reveals both [the] origins and the mechanisms by which 
the views in question try to conceal themselves.”95 Thus, Heidegger 
misinterprets that Nietzsche, as opposed to pursuing the analysis of the will to 
power as the Being of beings, is actually pursuing the will to power along the 
lines of a “new psychology,” and this demonstrates for Schrift that “Nietzsche 
is fundamentally engaged in a project quite different from that of 
metaphysics.”96 As previously stated, Nietzsche’s genealogy is quite specifically 
concerned with origins and the motivations behind the manifestation of 
various phenomena, concepts, and ways of being, for example, asking, out of 
what sort of impulses does the will to power arise “and toward what ends are 
these impulses directed?”97 Does the will to power result from life-affirming or 
life negating drives? Against the pursuit of metaphysics, Nietzsche is concerned 
ultimately with the transvaluation of values, which is the creation and 
determination of values anew.  Schrift correctly describes Nietzsche’s “psycho-
genealogy” as a method that functions simultaneously on a psychological and, 
perhaps more importantly, an axiological level, for Nietzsche’s thinking is 
never at a remove from the crucial assessment of values in the human life.  
According to Schrift, in Nietzsche’s thinking, “it is the question of the value of 
will to power and not the Being  of will to power that is of primary 
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importance.”98 In Heidegger’s exegesis, “the primacy of value inquiry is lost 
within [his] overdetermined metaphysical reading.”99 
Heidegger’s analysis emerges from a confrontation (Aus-einander-
setzung) with Nietzsche, resulting in what Heidegger believes is a  “genuine 
critique” of Nietzsche’s thought.  As opposed to critique as censure, 
Heidegger’s confrontational critique traces Nietzsche’s thought in its “effective 
force, not its weakness.”100 Such a method is the supreme way in which to 
bring a philosopher and philosophy to shine most profoundly.  Approaching 
Nietzsche as a thinker of great importance, Heidegger rescues him from the 
erroneous and damning classifications (e.g., “literary-philosopher,” 
“philosopher of life”) that impugn his viable philosophical contributions.   
Heidegger accomplishes what no other commentator has yet approached, 
namely reading Nietzsche as the proponent of a coherent, unified philosophy, 
organized around three interrelated tenets (i.e., “The Will to Power,” “Eternal 
Recurrence of the Same,” and “trans. by-valuation of Values”).  Heidegger’s 
“systematic” interpretation appears to avoid the disastrous consequences 
befalling others attempting to understand Nietzsche.  For example, Jaspers, in a 
state of bitter frustration, after the completion of his voluminous study, writes 
disparagingly of Nietzsche’s “endless reflection and questioning,” which 
Jaspers feels establishes “no foundations,” and brings forth only a series of 
disturbing “new paradoxes.”101 
As I have attempted to demonstrate, as much as Heidegger’s 
interpretation accomplishes it is not without problems, and, as some 
commentators have stated, when these problems are properly addressed, they 
expose the flaws in Heidegger’s reading, which amount in the extreme to a 
dogmatic misreading of Nietzsche.  With that being stated, Heidegger’s 
interpretation, whether severely flawed or not, still succeeds in elucidating the 
fact that Nietzsche is a legitimate philosophical force who must be considered, 
confronted, and perhaps, overcome.  For Nietzsche expresses the ultimate 
concern with “life,” and it seems that the awareness of creative life and the 
“return” of life is most vital to his unique and influential ideas about humanity, 
which reveal the foundations of a “new” life and existence, an existence that 
fruitfully springs from the renewal of the forgotten sensual and spiritual ties to 
earth, nature, and the body, a life in which humanity’s greatest possibilities are 
reflected within its creative artistic activity.  For Nehamas, one of the most 
important innovations that Heidegger introduced to the “reading” of Nietzsche 
is “the notion of the fragment” and the close-reading thereof,102 but as 
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demonstrated, this “innovation,” while holding the potential to radically change 
the way philosophical analysis is done, is also a source for concern.  In closing, 
perhaps the comments of Schrift are most relevant to the understanding of 
how to approach Heidegger’s metaphysical reading of Nietzsche: It is necessary 
to perform a careful reading of both philosophers, and further, agree to “read 
Nietzsche  with  Heidegger to appreciate the strength of the Heideggerian 
interpretation.”103 
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